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The Changing Determinants of High School Attainment  
in Rural China 
 
 
Abstract: 
The substantial shift in rural schooling levels and the contemporaneous changes in 
educational finance policy including tax and fees reform, two exempt and one compensation 
policy and school rearrangement policy, raise the need for a fresh look at the determinants of 
rural education. In this paper we have examined the determinants of rural high school 
attainment and changes in those determinants between the years 2002 and 2007 at multiple 
levels (individual, family and community level). We find that the increasing importance of 
community versus household and individual factors in determining rural children’s schooling 
attainment between 2002 and 2007. In addition, government expenditures have a significant 
and positive impact on high school attainment in both years, with a shift in the relative 
importance of budgetary versus extrabudgetary funding. 
 
Key words: rural education, high school attainment, family background, public finance, 
human capital, China 
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1. Introduction 
Studies of education in China have long noted the large and persistent gap in educational 
attainment between China’s urban and rural populations (Knight and Li 1993, Knight, Sicular 
and Yue 2013).  Although rural education levels continue to lag behind those in urban areas, 
the past fifteen years have seen a remarkable change in rural schooling attainment:  
attending high school is increasingly common (Connelly & Zheng, 2010). This change is 
evident in official statistics on school progression rates as well. Nationwide (including both 
urban and rural areas) between 2000 and 2009 the progression rate from junior high to high 
school (including both vocational and academic high schools) increased from 50 percent to 
over 80 percent (Figure 1).  Separate statistics on rural progression rates are not available, 
but in view of the facts that over 60 percent of children aged 15-17 are rural and that urban 
progression rates were already relatively high in 2000, we deduce that this increase reflects 
significant change in rural areas.1  This pattern is also evident in rural household survey 
data, including the survey data analyzed here (discussed in more detail later), which show an 
increase in high school attainment among children aged 16 through 20 years from less than 30 
percent in 2002 to nearly 40 percent in 2007.    
<Figure 1> 
  The expansion of high school attainment in rural China is related to several recent 
policy initiatives in the area of rural education, including the rolling out of free, compulsory 
nine-year education, the reform of rural educational finance, and substantial increases in 
government expenditures on rural education. In 2000 the Chinese government implemented 
the tax and fee reform in rural areas, which helped to reduce the financial burden of education 
on rural families. Around the same time, the government initiated the “two exempts and one 
compensation” program, which exempted poor rural students from the costs of textbooks and 
other miscellaneous educational fees and provided them compensation for living expenses in 
school dormitories. Expansion of free compulsory education occurred after 2000, especially 
in 2005 in poor areas and again in 2007 when free nine-year education was extended 
                                                        
1 Published statistics do not easily permit separation of progression rates between urban and rural students, in part 
because most rural high school children attend high schools located in towns and cities, not in villages.  
Consequently, statistics for rural high school enrolments undercount the number of rural children in high school, 
and statistics for urban high school enrolments include rural students.  These issues are discussed in Rozelle et al. 
(2009), which also reports the share of children aged 15-17 who are rural. 
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nationwide.  Concurrently with the implementation of these policies, government education 
spending per student increased substantially, and most rapidly for rural junior high school 
(figure 2). 
<Figure 2> 
Increased schooling levels in rural China, however, may also be the result of changes in 
household resources and choices.  After 2000 rural households enjoyed a period of rapid 
income growth. Also, family sizes declined, and levels of parental schooling was increasing.  
Past studies have found that such household characteristics are associated higher levels child 
schooling. It is also possible that the wage premium on a high-school education has increased; 
if so, this would lead rural families to increase investments in high school education for their 
children.    
 Much of the discourse about schooling in rural China has been in the context of the 
educational landscape that prevailed before these more recent developments. Most available 
studies about rural educational attainment in China use data from before 2005. Some analyses 
use more recent data, but focus on education in poor or minority areas, or of other subgroups 
for which educational attainment has not kept pace with broader trends.2   
The substantial shift in rural schooling levels and the contemporaneous changes in the 
macro and micro variables that underlie schooling outcomes raise the need for a fresh look at 
the determinants of rural education. This is the aim of our analysis, which examines changes 
in the determinants of high school attainment in rural China. Economists typically view 
schooling in developing countries as a household investment decision, and empirical analyses 
estimate the impact of family characteristics such as income, parental schooling, and the 
number of siblings on children’s schooling outcomes (Becker & Lewis 1973, Ashenfelter & 
Rouse 1998, Björklund et al. 2010, Lazear 1980).  Some studies also consider community or 
school district factors related to local economic development and school supply that may 
influence educational outcomes (Strauss, 1995).  In our analysis we examine the role of 
individual and household-level variables, local community variables, and, given the marked 
expansion in government funding of rural schools, local government educational 
                                                        
2 For an extensive review and thorough list of published articles on the determinants of educational differentials in 
China, see Zhang et al. (2012). 
 4
expenditures.  
 Changes in the determinants of school outcomes have been noted in other countries.  
For example, the cohort-specific effects of years of parents’ education on years of child’s 
education have been found to be higher for older cohorts and lower for younger cohorts (e.g. 
Hertz et al., 2007).  Some studies report that in developed countries the impact of family 
income is less significant after the expansion of education (Shavit ＆Blossfeld 1993, Erikson 
＆ Jonsson 1996b). These findings raise the question of whether with economic growth and 
the expansion of education in rural China, the impact of parental schooling and income has 
similarly declined. 
    The literature on the determinants of Chinese children’s schooling is now fairly 
extensive, and studies have found that the impact of family background and household 
characteristics has changed over time. Knight et al. (2011) investigate intergenerational 
mobility by cohort group using data for 2007.  They report that the correlation between 
parental schooling and children’s schooling has risen over time, but in recent years this trend 
has been reversed in rural areas. They attribute the reversal to the recent rural policy of free 
compulsory nine-year education.  Li (2010) shows that the expansion of higher education 
has augmented the impact of family background on children’s educational attainment, and 
that educational inequality between rural and urban areas is enlarging. Liu (2008) analyzes the 
influence of family background on children’s educational attendance of primary school and 
middle school using national census data from 1980, 1990 and 2000. He reports that that the 
significance and magnitude of the influence of parental education has increased over time, but 
the impact of the father’s career has remained unchanged. 
Our analysis makes several contributions. First, it provides new, relatively recent 
evidence on the determinants of rural high school attainment during this recent period of 
change.  Our analysis makes use of rural household survey data from the China Household 
Income Project (CHIP) for the years 2002 and 2007.  These two years are well suited for this 
study as 2002 was before (or mostly before) the rural education policy changes, and 2007 is 
after most of the key policy changes had been implemented nationally. 
Second, our analysis combines household data with village-level data and also with 
administrative data on local government education expenditures.  By so doing, we are able 
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to investigate the relationship of schooling outcomes with household characteristics and also 
community-level characteristics.  In this regard our analysis contributes to a growing body 
of work on the role factors outside the household that may influence household schooling 
decisions in rural China (e.g., Yang 2007), as well as to the more general literature on the 
impact on schooling outcomes of school resources and public educational spending (Card and 
Krueger 1992a, Hanushek 1997 and 2006, Cascio et al. 2011).  Our hypothesis is that 
community characteristics and public expenditures are significant determinants of high school 
attainment; in addition, we propose that between 2002 and 2007 the importance of household 
variables has declined, while that of community and government expenditure variables has 
been stable or even increased.   
Third, in our empirical analysis we employ a multilevel model. The empirical literature 
on high school attainment in general and in China often uses a standard probit or logit model 
(Jensen 1997, Al-Samarrais 1998, Sawada 2001, Yang 2007).  As discussed, however, the 
factors that affect household educational choices are multilevel. Schooling decisions within 
the same community may be not be independent, and variances may differ among 
communities.  Multilevel estimation methods can explicitly handle these factors and is well 
suited to hierarchically structured data such as that for students clustered within communities.  
Multilevel models, also known as hierarchical linear and mixed effects models, have been 
used elsewhere in the literature to examine how students’ test scores are influenced by both 
individuals and school-level factors.  
In the next section we outline our empirical approach.  Section three describes the data 
and provides some relevant policy background.  Section four reports the estimation results.  
As discussed in the concluding section, we find that some community variables and 
government expenditures are significantly related to high school attainment, and that in the 
wake of China’s rural education reforms, the significance of family income as a determinant 
of high school attainment has declined.  
2. Empirical Approach 
We are interested in estimating the effects of individual-level and community-level 
factors on an individual-level binary outcome variable.  In this context, observations within 
the same community are likely to be correlated, and the assumptions of the standard 
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regression model may be violated.  We therefore use a multilevel or hierarchical regression 
model with random intercepts.  This model estimates slope coefficients that are uniform for 
the entire sample, but allows the intercept to vary across communities.  A standard, 
single-level model is nested within the multilevel model, so that one can test which 
specification is appropriate.  Since our outcome variable is binary, we use a logit multilevel 
model.  In-depth discussion of such models can be found in Goldstein (2003), Snijders and 
Bosker (1999), Steele (2009) and Leckie (2010). 
Let Hij be a binary variable that equals one if individual i in community j attends or has 
attended high school.  The probability of high school attainment can be then written as ijp
Prob  .           (1) ijij pH == )1(
Using (1), we can then write the first-level logit regression equation as  
KijKijj
ij
ij xx
p
p βββ +++=− ...)1log( 110  ,      (2) 
where j0β is the intercept for community j, and the kβ are slope parameters on K 
individual-level characteristics . kijx
In a multilevel model both the intercept and slope parameters can be functions of 
community-level characteristics.  Due to the large number of individual and community 
characteristics relevant to high school attainment in our application of the model, a full 
multilevel model would yield an unwieldy number of interaction terms.  We therefore use a 
random intercept model in which community-level characteristics enter only through the 
intercept.  The second level regression equation is thus 
jMjMjj uqq 00101000 ... ++++= γγγβ  ,         (3) 
where 00γ  is the intercept, m0γ are slope parameters on M community-level characteristics 
, and is a random error term, normally distributed with mean zero. mjq ju0
 Equation (3) can be substituted into (2) to obtain a mixed multilevel logit regression 
equation that contains an intercept, individual-level characteristics, community-level 
characteristics, and an error term: 
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log( +++++++=− γγββγ  .  (4) 
This is the regression equation that we estimate.   
According to Raudenbush & Bryk (2002), estimation of a fully unconditional model 
without any predictors can provide information on how much variation lies at the community 
level and how much is due to individuals’ characteristics. As an initial step in multilevel 
analysis, then, it is useful to run an intercept only or “null” model   
j
ij
ij u
p
p
000)1
log( +=− γ  .  (5) 
Estimation of equation (5) yields an estimate of the average log odds of high school 
attainment 00γˆ .  The intercept for each community j is ju000 ˆˆ +γ , and the estimated variance 
among communities is .  A test of the hypothesis  indicates whether variance 
among communities is significant.   
2
0
ˆuσ 0ˆ 20 =uσ
3. Data, Descriptive Statistics and Policy Background 
In our analysis we use data from two sources.  Data on individual, household and 
village characteristics are from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP), and data on 
public educational expenditures are from the Ministry of Education.  The CHIP has 
conducted four rounds of household surveys of urban, rural and migrant households providing 
data for the years 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007.  In view of substantial differences in 
educational policies and educational access between urban and rural areas, we use only the 
rural data.  Since educational policies as well as the economic environment have changed 
dramatically over time, and since we have matching data for county-level public education 
expenditures only for later years, we confine our analysis to the two most recent rounds of the 
survey (2002 and 2007).   
The CHIP rural datasets contain household survey data with comprehensive information 
about individual and household characteristics, including education and schooling attainment.  
The CHIP also conducted village-level surveys so as to collect information about the 
communities within which the sample households reside.  The village data include 
information on schools and other community-level characteristics relevant to educational 
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outcomes.  We use data from the household survey for the first level, and data from the 
village survey for the second level, of the multilevel analysis.  The CHIP 2002 rural survey 
covers 22 provinces, 9200 households, and about 38000 individuals in 961 villages. The 
CHIP 2007 rural survey covers 9 provinces, 8000 households, and more than 31000 
individuals in 800 villages.  
In our analysis we restrict the sample to children who reside with their parents and who 
are 16 through 20 years old, inclusive.  By restricting the sample to children who reside with 
their parents, we have full, matched information about the children, their parents and their 
natal households.  In China children generally begin school at ages 6 through 8 and complete 
compulsory education (primary school and junior high school) in 8 to 9 years. The decision to 
continue on into high school thus occurs by age 16.3 We choose age 20 as upper limit on the 
age range in order to include as many observations as possible in the sample while 
minimizing selection bias that could arise due to older children moving out for work or to 
marry and establish their own households.  In the CHIP datasets a trivial number (only 3 in 
each year) of household heads and spouses of household heads are below the age of 21.  We 
therefore conclude that it is rare for children to marry and establish a new household before 
age 21.  With respect to migration, some children in this age range do engage in migrant 
work, but usually of a short-term nature.  Consequently, they continue to be treated as 
members of their natal households and are included in the survey.  In order to check for 
selection bias that might arise if some older children have left the households, we carried out 
the estimation using an alternative maximum age cutoff of 18 rather than 20.  The results 
were stable, and so we conclude that using the older maximum age cutoff of 20 does not bias 
the results.  The restricted sample contains 3973 individuals in 2002 and 2559 in 2007. 
We match the CHIP data with county-level data from the Ministry of Education on 
public expenditures on junior high school education for the years 1999 through 2007.  These 
data allow us to analyze the impact on high school attainment of public education 
                                                        
3 Some may argue that attending high school requires passing certain qualification exams and that not all students 
are qualified to attend high school. Some key high schools do indeed require a comparatively high examination 
score, but other types of high schools do not have selection criteria.  In our analysis high school includes all types 
of secondary schools, including regular senior middle schools, adult senior middle schools, regular secondary 
technical schools, vocational secondary schools, technical secondary schools, and adult technical secondary 
schools.   
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expenditures. 4   Specifically, we estimate the impact on the likelihood of high school 
attainment of public budgetary (yusuannei) and extrabudgetary (yusuanwai) operating 
expenditures (shiye zhichu) per student in junior high schools, the level of school immediately 
preceding high school.  We expect that public expenditures at the junior high school level are 
relevant to high school attainment because these expenditures are correlated with the quality 
and cost of education during the three years of education that precede high school, and so 
influence the willingness and ability of children to continue on to high school.   
In rural China the level and structure of public educational funding changed during the 
years under study here.  Between 2002 and 2007, China adopted nationwide a policy of free 
public education through primary and junior high school.  This policy was accompanied by 
increased public budgetary spending (see Figure 2), and the costs of education during the first 
nine years borne by households were reduced.  This increase in government funding and 
reduction in costs borne by households could have altered the relative importance of 
household income versus public expenditures in determining children’s school attainment.  
The increase in government funding of rural primary and junior high school education 
was accompanied by policy measures aimed at reducing the role of extrabudgetary finance as 
a source of education funding.  In China, extrabudgetary funding for schools has included 
revenues from various sources such as a dedicated education fee (jiaoyu fujiafei) assessed on 
rural enterprises and households (starting in 2002 the rural tax and fee reform prohibited the 
assessment of such fees on rural households), tuition and fees, other revenues raised by 
schools themselves, and funding for schools paid directly by institutions or enterprises 
(Kipnis and Li 2010, Li, Park and Wang 2007).  Although policy reforms have reduced the 
relative importance of extrabudgetary funding for schools, they may remain important (Kipnis 
and Li 2010, Li, Park and Wang 2007) and ideally should be included in the analysis.   
Since we are analyzing high school attainment for individuals who are already of high 
school age or older, in our analysis we use public expenditure data for the preceding years, 
that is, in our analysis of high school attainment of individuals in the 2007 CHIP dataset, we 
                                                        
4 We acknowledge that the official data on educational expenditures in China do not capture all sources of public 
and quasi-public funding.  We expect, however, that the officially reported expenditures are correlated with 
unreported and quasi-public funding.  See Kipnis and Li (2010) for a discussion of the nature of such unreported 
funds based on fieldwork in Shandong province. 
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use average public expenditure data for the years 2004-2006, and in our analysis of 
individuals in the 2002 CHIP dataset, we use average public expenditure data for the years 
1999-2001. 
The Ministry of Education data after 2001 are more complete than those for 1999-2001.  
Starting in 2002 the dataset contains both budgetary and extrabudgetary spending on 
operating expenses per student, which together add up to total public expenditures on 
operating expenses for junior high school per student.  For 1999-2001 the data contain 
budgetary expenditures, but not extrabudgetary expenditures.  The 1999-2001 data, however, 
contain information on total and budgetary operational expenditures per capita (renjun jiaoyu 
jingfei zong zhichu and qizhong renjun caizheng yusuannei jiaoyu jingfei zhichu) for primary 
school and junior high school together.  With this information we calculate the ratio of 
extrabudgetary to budgetary spending for both levels of school.  We use this ratio to 
calculate county-level estimates of extrabudgetary expenditures per student for junior high 
school.  This approach assumes that within each county the ratio of extrabudgetary to 
budgetary spending for junior middle school is the same as that for primary school.5             
We note that county-level data are not available for all the counties in the CHIP surveys.  
In 2002 the CHIP survey covers 122 counties, but county-level data for the three years 
1999-2001 are missing for 21 of these counties.  The matched dataset therefore covers 101 
counties.  In 2007 county-level data are missing for one of the 82 CHIP counties, so the 
matched dataset covers 81 counties. The numbers of individuals aged 16-20 in the matched 
datasets are 2796 and 2427 in 2002 and 2007, respectively.  The reasons for missing counties 
are unclear, but we believe they are related to the renaming, reconfiguration, or 
reclassification of counties.   
Figure 3 compares budgetary educational expenditures per student in junior high school 
in the sample counties with the national and regional averages.  Expenditure levels in the 
sample counties are similar to, although slightly lower than, the national average.  This 
pattern basically holds for the different regions (East, Center and West), although we note that 
                                                        
5 Since the dataset contains information on both budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures for junior middle 
school and for other levels of school for the years 2002-2006, we can check whether this assumption is reasonable.  
Using the data for 2002, we have compared the ratio of budgetary to extrabudgetary spending for junior middle 
school to the ratio for all levels of school.  We found that the ratio is almost 1:1, and it holds for year 2003-2006 
as well. 
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the expenditure levels differ by region.  Per student expenditures are highest in the East and 
lowest in the West.  We conclude that the counties in our sample are not unusual with respect 
to the levels of public investment in education.   
< Figure 3> 
<Tables 1 and 2> 
Table 1 reports the definitions of and Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for variables 
used in our analysis.  Descriptive statistics are reported both for the full restricted sample of 
individuals aged 16 through 20 and for the reduced sample for which we have matched 
county-level data.  The characteristics of the full and reduced samples are not significantly 
different.   
High school attainment is measured by the dummy variable chigh, which equals one if 
the child is attending or has ever attended high school.  On average in our full sample, the 
rate of high school attainment for individuals aged 16 through 20 increased from 28% in 2002 
to 38% in 2007.  The total years of schooling of their parents (sum of the mother’s and 
father’s education years) also increased, from 13.1 years in 2002 to 14.7 years in 2007.  In 
both years males made up slightly more than half of the sample.  The number of siblings 
declined, reflecting the impact of the one-child (or, in some rural areas, one-and-a-half child) 
policy, and perhaps also due to changing preferences for family size.   
These five years were a period of fairly rapid macroeconomic growth, as reflected in 
increases in household income per capita as well as in public expenditures on education.  In 
nominal terms, household income nearly doubled.  Government per student expenditures on 
junior high school also nearly doubled (in nominal terms).  The composition of government 
expenditures changed, with the share of extrabudgetary expenditures declining from 41% to 
27%.  This change is consistent with fiscal reforms that occurred during this time frame.   
Some other potentially important policy changes also took place between 2002 and 2007.  
Starting in the late 1990s, but especially during first decade of the 2000s, China carried out a 
“school consolidation” policy that involved pooling students into fewer, complete primary 
schools so as to improve the quality of schooling (see Chen et al. 2011).  This policy resulted 
in a marked reduction in the number of rural primary schools.  Between 2002 and 2007 the 
number of rural primary schools nationwide declined by 29 percent (from 384,004 to 
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271,584) and the number of rural junior middle schools declined 12 percent (from 39735 to 
32865) (NBS 2008 and 2003).6  
These changes are reflected in the CHIP village data.  The share of villages in our 
sample without primary schools or teaching points increased from 34% to 57%.7  These 
changes in the supply of schooling within villages at the primary level may have affected 
schooling choices.  We also include in our analysis a variable that captures the supply of, or 
access to, junior high schools.  We note that the village-level information about junior high 
schools is not consistent for the two years.  In 2002 we have information on the distance 
(kilometers) to the nearest junior high school, and in 2007 we have information on the travel 
time (hours) to the nearest junior high school.   
4. Estimation Results 
Table 3 reports results from the null model.  For both 2002 and 2007 the estimated 
variance of the error term exceeds 0.5.  A test of the hypothesis  is rejected, 
indicating that variance among communities is significant.  We conclude that 
community-level characteristics play a role in explaining variation in high school attainment.     
2
0
ˆuσ 0ˆ 20 =uσ
<Table 3> 
Table 4 contains results from estimation of multilevel logit models that contain 
individual and family characteristics, but no village-level variables.  Village-level effects, 
however, enter through the random intercept.  Table 4 reports estimates for two models that 
differ only in the way that household income enters the model.  In model 1, income enters 
the regression as the continuous variable lnhincome (the log of household income per capita).  
In model 2, income enters as a set of dummy variables, lowhincome (=1 if household income 
per capita is in the bottom quarter of the sample income distribution) and highhincome (=1 if 
household income per capita is in the top quarter of the sample income distribution), with the 
omitted category being income per capita falling in the middle two quarters of the sample 
income distribution.  Model 2 allows us to explore whether the coefficient on income is 
different for low and high income groups.  Such could be the case if credit constraints 
                                                        
6 These statistics on numbers of schools count regular primary and regular secondary schools; they do not include 
other types of schools such as primary teaching points and vocational secondary schools. 
7 Teaching points are one-room schools that provided schooling for early grades, typically grades 1 through 4.  
See Chen at al., 2011. 
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differentially constrain education investments.  Because household incomes increased 
substantially between 2002 and 2007, and because of the educational reforms that eliminated 
tuition costs for junior high school education in rural areas, we expect that the estimated 
coefficients on these income variables may have changed between the two years. 
<Table 4> 
Otherwise, models 1 and 2 are the same.  Both include as independent variables the age 
and age squared of the child, the number of siblings, and dummy variables for whether the 
child is male, has a single parent, lives with a grandparent, and has an ethnic minority father.  
Both models also include province dummy variables to control for provincial-level fixed 
effects.  
Empirical studies find that in developing countries family income plays an important 
role in children’s educational attainment (Jacoby, 1997, Sawada & Lokshin, 2001, Ota & 
Moffatt, 2002). Studies for rural China generally report similar findings (e.g., Zhao & 
Glewwe 2010).  Our estimates for 2002 are consistent with the literature (Table 4).  For 
2002, in model 1 the coefficient on household income per capita is significant and positive, 
implying that higher income is associated with a higher probability of high school attainment.  
In model 2, compared to children in the middle two income quartiles, children in the poorest 
quartile have a lower probability, and children in the richest quartile a higher probability, of 
progressing to high school.  These findings are consistent with what one would expect if 
poorer households face binding credit constraints that make it difficult for them to finance 
their children’s high school education, and also if poorer households are more likely to 
withdraw children from school earlier so that the children can enter the labor force and 
contribute to household income.  Furthermore, low-income parents may not expect the same 
economic returns to their children’s education as do higher-income parents (Lazear 1980).  
Interestingly, in 2007 none of the household income variables is significant, that is, 
household income is not significantly correlated with high school attainment.  We suggest 
several possible explanations for this result.  One explanation is that due the substantial 
increases in household incomes between 2002 and 2007 relaxed credit constraints faced by 
lower income families.  Another explanation is that increased government expenditures on 
rural education may have reduced the importance of family resources.  We explore this 
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mechanism further in the next section of the paper by introducing government educational 
expenditures into the regression model.     
Most of the other explanatory variables in models 1 and 2 have the expected signs.  The 
impact of parental schooling on children’s educational achievement has received attention in 
the economics literature.  Studies have found that one or both parents’ education has a 
significant impact on children’s schooling (e.g.,Behrman & Knowles 1999, Handa 1996, 
Oreopoulos 2006, and Tansel 1997).  In the research on China, Hannum (2005), Connelly & 
Zheng (2003) and Liu (2007) report that parental education is significant, but Brown & Park 
(2002) and Li & Tsang (2003) report that neither parents’ education is significant.  We find 
that the coefficient on parental schooling (the sum years of schooling of the mother and 
father) is significant and positive in both 2002 and 2007.8 The magnitude of the coefficient is 
a bit smaller, however, in 2007.  We note that since we do not include any measures of 
children’s ability in our regression, the coefficient on parents’ education may be capturing the 
unobserved ability of the parents, which is likely correlated with the ability of their children. 
Studies have found that boys are more likely to attend high school (Admas & Hannum, 
2005, Connelly & Zheng, 2003, Hannum, 2003).  Our findings show that the coefficient on 
the male dummy variable is significant and positive in 2002, but it becomes smaller and less 
significant in 2007, suggesting some erosion of the privileged position of boys.  This would 
be consistent with a story in which as incomes increase, the costs of schooling decline, and 
family sizes shrink, households are less financially constrained and so do not have to choose 
boys over girls.  Our results regarding number of siblings are also consistent with this story.  
We find that children with more siblings are less likely to attend high school, but the 
magnitude and significance of the relationship are smaller in 2007 than in 2002. Other studies 
on China have also found a negative relationship between number of siblings and school 
attainment (Connelly & Zheng 2003, Hannum 2003).     
Children’s health status has a significant, negative impact on high school attainment in 
                                                        
8 Parental schooling for children in a single family are calculated by the schooling of household head plus 
household spouse. If either mother or father’s schooling is missing, the missing value is replaced by the average 
schooling of spouse for matched marriage. For example, if father’s schooling of children who live with a single 
mother is missing and the highest qualification of this single mother is upper secondary school, then this child’s 
father’s schooling is replaced by 13, since the average schooling of husband for women with an upper secondary 
school qualification is 13 years. This processing method may be not reasonable, but the missing values is less than 
5% and will not largely affect our results. 
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2002, but not in 2007.  The reasons for this change again may be related to the increased 
income levels, which provide families with more resources to invest in health and pay for 
health care.  It may also reflect the implementation of the new rural cooperative medical care 
scheme, which was initiated in 2003; by 2007 the national participation rate of rural residents 
in this scheme had reached 86 percent (NBS 2011, Table 21-21).  The new rural cooperative 
medical scheme is a voluntary program that provides coverage of inpatient medical care and 
insurance against catastrophic costs for a modest enrolment fee (Li, Sato and Sicular 2013).  
In 2002 the rural cooperative medical scheme was not yet available, and most rural 
households had no access to health insurance.   
The estimated coefficients on the dummy variable for minority status are not significant 
in either year.  Research about the effect of minority status on schooling in rural areas is 
limited, but a study by Connelly & Zheng (2003) found that minority pupils have limited 
educational opportunity.  Having a single parent also does not have a significant coefficient 
in either year.  This result is at odds with evidence for the U.S. that finds children living with 
both parents are more likely to attend high school (Oreopolous et al. 2006).  A possible 
reason for a different finding in rural China is that with the expansion of migrant work, it is 
now common for a parent to be absent even in households that have not experienced the 
divorce or death of a parent.  Also, the presence of other adult relatives such as grandparents 
could compensate for the absence of a parent.  Indeed, our estimates for 2002 indicate that 
children who lived with a grandparent were significantly more likely to attend high school.  
The role of grandparents, however, is no longer significant in 2007. 
Table 5 reports results from estimation of multilevel logit regression models that contain 
community characteristics as well as individual and family characteristics.  We have 
estimated three alternative specifications.  Model 3 includes village-level characteristics but 
not government expenditure variables.  Model 4 includes village-level characteristics and 
total county government expenditures per student on junior high school.  Model 5 is the 
same as model 4 except that budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures enter separately, so 
that we can identify whether these two sources of funds have had different effects on our 
outcome variable. Government expenditure variables enter the model in log form.  In all the 
models in Table 5, household income is measured using the continuous variable lnhincome.  
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These three models also include all the other individual and household variables in models 1 
and 2, as well as provincial dummy variables. 
The village-level variables we use in these models are related to community educational 
resources and to the overall socio-economic environment in the village.  The variable 
vnoprimary is a dummy variable that equals one if the village does not have a primary school, 
vmiddistan is a measure of the distance from the village to the nearest junior middle school 
(2007 in kilometers; 2002 in travel time), and lnvincome is the log of average household 
income per capita in the village.  We also estimated alternative specifications that included a 
variety of other village-level variables, and we examined whether village characteristics were 
correlated with individual and household characteristics by including the village means of 
household net income per capita and parental schooling as centering variables, but these 
variables were not statistically significant, so we do not report the results here.9  
The potential impact of these village-level variables on children’s high school attainment 
is not entirely straightforward.  We would expect that the presence of a primary school in the 
village and shorter distance to a junior high school would, all else equal, reduce the costs of 
education and so increase the probability of continuing on in school.  It is possible, however, 
that a trade-off exists between numbers of rural schools and their quality, and that the 
consolidation of village schools between 2002 and 2007 was accompanied by an improved 
quality of education in the remaining, more distant schools.  Research has found that school 
quality is important to students’ educational achievement and to schooling decisions (Card & 
Krueger, 1992, Tan et. al. 1997). Low-quality schools may induce pupils to lose interest in 
their studies and push students out of schools.   
Unfortunately we do not have any measures of school quality in our dataset, so we 
cannot measure the impact of school quality directly.  Average village income, however, may 
be correlated with and so capture some of the effects of school quality.  Also, models 4 and 5 
include government expenditure variables, which may be correlated with school quality.      
With respect to village average income, on one hand it is possible that the opportunity 
                                                        
9 Other village-level variables included the village population (or number of households), the percentage of 
individuals in the village who are members of an ethnic minority, the percentage of the village labor force engaged 
in migrant employment, the percentage of the village labor force not working in agriculture, the local wage for 
unskilled labor, and distance to the nearest town or city. 
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cost (foregone income earned by the child) of keeping children in school is greater in villages 
with a high average income per capita. Consequently, students in such villages may leave 
school at an earlier stage.  On the other hand, villages with higher incomes and better 
socio-economic conditions may have more community resources to support schooling, and 
also their richer cultural environment and positive peer effects may raise schooling levels for 
all families.  Household budget constraints may be less constraining in richer villages, 
because such villages sometimes provide subsidies to children of low-income families and 
school quality may be higher, which can increase the expected returns to education (Knight et 
al. 2009).   
Comparing model 3 to model 1, we find that including village-level variables improves 
the fit of the regression model slightly, as the AIC and BIC statistics of model 3 are smaller.  
Nevertheless, few of the village-level variables are significant.  The only significant village 
characteristic is average village income in 2007.  The log of average village income has a 
positive coefficient in both years, but is significant only in 2007.  This finding suggests that 
the influence of the community’s economic environment on educational attainment became 
more important between 2002 and 2007.  
We note that the results for model 3 indicate that the presence or absence of a primary 
school within the village is not a significant determinant of high school attainment.  Model 
3, however, does not control for differences school quality between village schools and 
schools in townships where students from surrounding villages are pooled.  The findings of 
models 4 and 5, which include government expenditure variables, provide additional insights 
on this point.   
<Table 5> 
Models 4 and 5 add government expenditure variables to the set of community-level 
characteristics (see Table 5).  Model 4 includes total expenditures on junior high schools per 
student (the sum of budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditures), and in model 5, budgetary 
and extrabudgetary expenditures enter the model separately.  To investigate whether 
government funding of schools has larger effects for poorer households, and for girls than 
boys, we also estimated alternative model specifications that included interactions between 
government expenditures and household income and interactions between government 
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expenditures and the gender of the child.  None of the interaction terms was significant, 
however, so we do not report the results here. 
Adding government expenditure variables further improves the fit of the regression 
models, especially in 2002, and the results support the conclusion that government 
expenditures are positively and significantly related to high school attainment.  The 
estimates for model 4 give significant, positive coefficients on total government expenditures 
for both 2002 and 2007.  The magnitude of the coefficient is similar in 2002 and 2007, 
indicating that the substantial increases in government expenditures on rural schools between 
the two years did not diminish the size of the relationship between government expenditures 
and the outcome variable.   
The estimates for model 5 reveal differences in the impact of budgetary versus 
extrabudgetary finance.  In both years budgetary expenditures have a positive, significant 
coefficient, with the coefficient increasing slightly and becoming more significant in 2007.  
In 2002 the coefficient of extrabudgetary expenditures is positive and significant, although 
smaller in magnitude than budgetary expenditures.  In 2007 it is no longer significant.  
These results suggest that China’s school finance reforms may have had the intended effect of 
increasing the role of budgetary funds and reducing the role of extrabudgetary funds in rural 
education.   
Comparing the results for models 4 and 5 with model 3, we find that including 
government expenditure variables does not much alter the estimated coefficients of other 
independent variables.  One coefficient that does change, however, is that for vnoprimary, 
which is not significant in model 3 but becomes significant in 2002 when government 
expenditures are included in the regression.  We would explain this as follows:  all else 
equal, students who live in villages without schools are less likely to progress to high school.  
All else equal, students at low quality schools are also less likely to progress to high school.  
Village schools tend to be lower quality schools, so the positive effect of having a school in 
the village will be offset by the quality of education unless the regression controls for the 
quality of schooling.  Consequently, the coefficient on vnoprimary will be biased upward.  
If government expenditures are correlated with school quality, then including controls for 
government expenditures could reduce this bias.  This would explain why the coefficient on 
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vnoprimary becomes significant in models 4 and 5. 
We conclude this section with some observations about the coefficients on the household 
and village income variables. In all the models household income per capita is significant in 
2002 but not in 2007. These results point to a decline in the importance of household income 
as a factor affecting whether or not children continue into high school, although other 
household-level characteristics such as parents’ education continue to be significant.  In 
contrast, village average income is not significant in 2002 but becomes significant in 2007. 
Community-level resources, then, appear to have become more important.  Government 
expenditures are significant in both years.  The fact that the coefficients on both household 
and village income decline somewhat when government expenditures are added in the model 
suggests that regressions that do not include government spending may overstate the role of 
individual and village incomes.        
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the determinants rural high school attainment and 
changes in those determinants between the years 2002 and 2007.  Our analysis examines 
determinants at multiple levels: at the individual and family levels, and at the community 
level.  In our analysis we employ a multilevel binary response model, which addresses some 
of the empirical issues associated with hierarchical, clustered data and heteroscedasticity.  
Although our sample does not cover all provinces in China, all major regions are represented 
and the findings can provide some valuable insights.   
We find that household and individual characteristics continue to influence high school 
attainment, but their importance declined between 2002 and 2007. The effects of parental 
schooling and the child’s gender are positive and significant in both years, but their magnitude 
decreases.  The effects of the number of siblings and household income are significant in 
2002, but no longer so in 2007.  We believe that these results are consistent with changes 
that occurred during this period: the relaxation of financial constraints on rural households 
due to increases in household incomes, and reduced out-of-pocket costs of primary and junior 
high school education. We note, however, that the relationship between income and schooling 
outcomes does not appear to differ systematically between poorer and richer households.    
We find the opposite direction of changes for village-level variables.  Average village 
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income and the presence or absence of a primary school within the village are not significant 
in 2002, but they become significant in 2007. These results suggest the increasing importance 
of community versus household and individual factors in determining rural children’s 
schooling attainment.  The significant impact of the presence of a village primary school 
raises questions about China’s rural school consolidation policy.  It suggests that if the 
quality of village schools can be improved, then maintaining some schools in villages may 
encourage more rural students to continue in school.   
Government expenditures have a significant and positive impact on high school 
attainment in both years, with a shift in the relative importance of budgetary versus 
extrabudgetary funding.  This finding confirms the importance of public education finance 
as a factor contributing to increases in rural school attainment.  Although the average level 
of public expenditures per student has risen, large disparities persist among regions and 
localities (as reflected in Figure 3).  Despite increased central funding, local educational 
finance continues to depend on the resources of local governments, and richer localities have 
more resources than do poorer localities.  In the future, then, educational funding policies 
should pay attention not only to the average level of funding, but to the distribution of 
funding.  The same considerations apply to private and quasi-public funding for schools, 
which are not captured in our analysis (Kipnis and Li 2010).  These hidden forms of 
education funding warrant closer attention in future research.  
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Table 1.  Definitions of the variables 
Variable Definition 
Chigh High school attainment:  if the child has ever attended or is currently 
attending high school ＝1, otherwise ＝0 
Male Male=1, female =0 
Age Child’s age 
Age2  Child’s age, squared 
Badhealth If the child’s health status is somewhat poor or poor =1, otherwise =0 
Sib Number of siblings 
Hincome Household annual net income per capita (unit: 10 thousand yuan; logged in 
the regressions) 
Highhincome If household annual net income per capita is in the highest quartile of the 
sample distribution =1, otherwise =0 
Lowhincome If household annual net income per capita is in the bottom quartile of the 
sample distribution =1, otherwise =0 
Pschool Sum of father’s and mother’s years of schooling  
Single If the child has a widowed or divorced parent =1, otherwise =0 
Grandparent If a grandparent lives in the household =1, otherwise =0 
Fminority If father is an ethnic minority (not Han) =1, otherwise =0 
Vnoprimary If the village has no primary school or teaching point =1, otherwise =0 
Vmiddistan Distance to the nearest junior middle school (unit: kilometers in 2002; 
hours of travel time in 2007) 
Vincome Average household annual net income per capita in the village (unit: 10 
thousand yuan; logged in regressions) 
Total govedu Average government operational expenditures on junior high school, per 
student, during the prior three years (note: equals the sum of budgetary and 
extrabudgetary expenditures) (unit: 1 thousand yuan) 
Budgetary 
govedu 
Average government budgetary operational expenditures on junior high 
school, per student, during the prior three years (unit: 1 thousand yuan; 
logged in regressions) 
Extrabudgetary 
govedu 
Average government extrabudgetary operational expenditures on junior 
high school, per student, during the prior three years (unit: 1 thousand yuan; 
logged in regressions) 
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
2002 2007 2002 2007 
Mean 
Std. 
Err. Mean 
Std. 
Err. Mean 
Std. 
Err. Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
chigh 0.282 0.450 0.383 0.486 0.287 0.452 0.385 0.487 
male 0.525 0.499 0.518 0.500 0.523 0.500 0.519 0.500 
age 17.89 1.430 18.11 1.373 17.91 1.430 18.11 1.373 
age2 322.1 51.39 329.8 49.64 322.7 51.40 329.8 49.61 
badhealth 0.0327 0.178 0.0686 0.253 0.0311 0.174 0.0669 0.250 
sib 1.486 0.993 1.166 0.931 1.415 0.935 1.137 0.913 
hincome 0.263 0.215 0.516 0.409 0.263 0.201 0.514 0.414 
highhincome 0.250 0.433 0.250 0.433 0.263 0.440 0.243 0.429 
lowhincome 0.250 0.433 0.250 0.433 0.252 0.434 0.254 0.435 
pschool 13.14 4.472 14.70 3.552 13.14 4.551 14.73 3.533 
single 0.0201 0.140 0.00662 0.0811 0.0154 0.123 0.00685 0.0825 
grandparent 0.132 0.338 0.0245 0.155 0.128 0.334 0.0254 0.157 
fminority 0.146 0.353 0.00779 0.0879 0.153 0.360 0.00806 0.0895 
vnoprimary 0.340 0.474 0.565 0.496 0.351 0.477 0.573 0.495 
vmiddistan 3.682 4.870 2.028 0.817 3.511 3.880 2.046 0.818 
vincome 0.240 0.137 0.426 0.245 0.240 0.121 0.426 0.250 
total govedu     1.076 0.597 2.107 3.173 
budgetary 
govedu     0.631 0.374 1.531 2.816 
extrabudgetary 
govedu     0.445 0.292 0.576 0.556 
observations 3973 3973 2559 2559 2796 2796 2514 2514 
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 Table 3.  Null logit model of high school attainment, with only village fixed effects 
 2002 2007 
Fixed effect Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Intercept (γ00) -1.136 0.072 -0.756 0.073 
Random effect Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Residual  2
0u
σ 0.644 0.125 0.548 0.120 
observations 2664 2131 
LR test vs. logistic regression 2χ  
(Prob ൒ 2χ ) 
87.86 (2) 
(0.000) 
65.90 (2) 
(0.000) 
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Table 4.  Multilevel logit model of high school attainment, without community-level 
characteristics  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 2002 2007 2002 2007 
male 0.199** 0.164* 0.204** 0.159 
 (2.403) (1.688) (2.474) (1.641) 
age 6.716*** 2.890*** 6.719*** 2.975*** 
 (7.680) (2.775) (7.628) (2.839) 
age2 -0.185*** -0.089*** -0.186*** -0.091*** 
 (-7.623) (-3.064) (-7.570) (-3.128) 
badhealth -0.514** 0.296 -0.508** 0.300 
 (-1.999) (1.506) (-1.972) (1.525) 
sib -0.179*** -0.123* -0.186*** -0.113* 
 (-3.338) (-1.872) (-3.473) (-1.671) 
log hincome 0.360*** 0.115   
 (4.577) (1.207)   
lowhincome   -0.303*** -0.057 
   (-2.632) (-0.463) 
highhincome   0.246** 0.008 
   (2.316) (0.064) 
pschool 0.102*** 0.072*** 0.105*** 0.074*** 
 (9.419) (4.949) (9.663) (5.082) 
single 0.095 -0.663 0.134 -0.679 
 (0.292) (-0.923) (0.410) (-0.946) 
grandparent 0.444*** 0.321 0.439*** 0.338 
 (3.698) (1.044) (3.649) (1.101) 
fminority -0.191 0.582 -0.190 0.536 
 (-0.934) (0.885) (-0.929) (0.816) 
Constant -61.868*** -25.030*** -62.481*** -25.760*** 
 (-7.905) (-2.678) (-7.925) (-2.740) 
observations 3,973 2,559 3,973 2,559 
groups 880 705 880 705 
random effect intercept 0.471 
(0.105) 
0.698 
(0.145) 
0.475 
(0.105) 
0.691 
(0.144) 
AIC 4260.114 3199.925 4268.234 3208.356 
BIC 4461.307 3324.025 4475.714 3325.366 
LR test versus logistic 
regression 2χ (df) 
(Prob ൒ 2χ ) 
39.50 (32) 
(0.000) 
55.29 (19) 
(0.000) 
40.51 (33) 
(0.000) 
54.25 (20) 
(0.000) 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.  Multilevel logit model of high school attainment, with community-level 
characteristics  
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 
Male 0.200** 0.169* 0.241** 0.176* 0.230** 0.175* 
 (2.413) (1.750) (2.502) (1.763) (2.394) (1.747) 
age 6.716*** 2.891*** 6.026*** 2.846*** 5.911*** 2.850*** 
 (7.672) (2.760) (5.924) (2.660) (5.822) (2.626) 
age2 -0.185*** -0.089*** -0.166*** -0.088*** -0.163*** -0.088*** 
 (-7.616) (-3.050) (-5.873) (-2.949) (-5.772) (-2.910) 
badhealth -0.511** 0.279 -0.448 0.254 -0.450 0.253 
 (-1.989) (1.420) (-1.475) (1.243) (-1.485) (1.236) 
sib -0.178*** -0.083 -0.199*** -0.056 -0.209*** -0.058 
 (-3.314) (-1.253) (-3.109) (-0.794) (-3.286) (-0.814) 
log hincome 0.345*** 0.036 0.278*** 0.023 0.281*** 0.024 
 (4.192) (0.370) (2.863) (0.226) (2.892) (0.243) 
pschool 0.101*** 0.069*** 0.097*** 0.063*** 0.098*** 0.063*** 
 (9.327) (4.744) (7.900) (4.200) (7.976) (4.204) 
single 0.092 -0.623 0.147 -0.590 0.151 -0.595 
 (0.282) (-0.874) (0.350) (-0.822) (0.360) (-0.827) 
grandparent 0.447*** 0.288 0.325** 0.416 0.327** 0.415 
 (3.715) (0.936) (2.270) (1.296) (2.285) (1.293) 
fminority -0.172 0.749 -0.190 0.495 -0.259 0.505 
 (-0.840) (1.141) (-0.832) (0.747) (-1.113) (0.760) 
vnoprimary -0.121 0.076 -0.008 -0.247** -0.003 -0.208* 
 (-1.115) (0.608) (-0.059) (-2.042) (-0.022) (-1.729) 
vmiddistan -0.005 -0.074 -0.020 -0.111 -0.025 -0.114 
 (-0.484) (-0.980) (-1.270) (-1.426) (-1.528) (-1.460) 
log vincome 0.082 0.404*** -0.110 0.287** -0.084 0.290** 
 (0.628) (3.475) (-0.676) (2.377) (-0.516) (2.397) 
log totalgovedu   0.617*** 0.560***   
   (3.429) (3.754)   
log budgetary 
govedu 
    0.362* 0.417** 
     (1.709) (2.524) 
log extrabudgetary 
govedu 
    0.287* 0.122 
     (1.654) (0.797) 
constant -61.645*** -24.341*** -59.089*** -24.157** -57.112*** -23.866** 
 (-7.869) (-2.591) (-6.379) (-2.519) (-6.223) (-2.454) 
observations 3,973 2,559 2796 2,427 2796 2,427 
groups 880 705 624 673 624 673 
random effect 0.460 0.663 0.277 0.577 0.273 0.581 
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intercept 
 (0.104) (0.141) (0.104) (0.147) (0.104) (0.148) 
AIC 4254.093 3189.939 3065.714 3007.491 3069.922 3010.306 
BIC 4434.147 3318.581 3273.472 3140.762 3283.616 3149.372 
LR test versus logistic 
regression: 2χ (df) 
(Prob ൒ 2χ ) 
36.35 (35) 
(0.000) 
50.36 (22) 
(0.000) 
11.00 (36) 48.40 (23) 10.41 (37) 
(0.000) 
48.82 (24) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 1.  National junior high and high school progression rates, 1990-2008 
Notes:  Progression rates are calculated as the number of entrants to the given level of 
schooling divided by the number of graduates from the prior level of schooling. These data 
are from the same year; that is, entrants to school in August/September are divided by 
graduates who finished school several months earlier, that is, in June/July of the same year. 
The high school progression rate includes entrants to technical secondary schools.  
Sources:  NBS (1996, 2001, 2009); Ministry of Education, Department of Planning (1991); 
Ministry of Education, Department of Development and Planning (2008). 
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 Figure 2 National average total educational expenditures per student, 1988-2008 
 Source: Ministry of Education data. 
 
 
  
 
  
Figure 3 Budgetary educational expenditure on rural junior high school, per student 
 Source:  Ministry of Education data. 
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